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1 Introduction
The livestock sector generates a large portion of national economies in African dry-lands and is the principal source of livelihood for pastoralists living there. Pastoral-
ism is the main livelihood for an estimated 268 million people and represents 10 to 44 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of African countries (FAO 2018). However, 
pastoralists are often among the poorest—for example, 41 percent of pastoralists across 
the Horn of Africa are estimated to live in extreme poverty, which is well above the na-
tional averages of the region.
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Frequent and severe drought is a tremendous risk for 
pastoral communities; drought-related livestock losses 
can push households into a poverty trap and chron-
ic destitution (Jensen et al. 2015; Lybbert et al. 2004). 
This has, in turn, severe consequences on the effica-
cy of countries’ and international donors’ efforts to im-
prove welfare and develop the economies in pastoral 
regions. In spite of these challenges, donors' and gov-
ernments' response to crises often arrives very late, on 
average six months after the drought has set in (Clarke 
and Dercon 2016). The delayed response and access 
to support lead to loss of livelihoods and sometimes 
lives, weakening recovery from the crisis even after the 
conditions have improved. Furthermore, the govern-
ments' ex post response to shocks is costly because 
it results in budget reallocations that might affect basic 
government functions (Clarke and Dercon 2016). The 
increased impacts of natural disasters due to climate 
and environmental changes call for adoption of new 
and innovative ways of funding disasters. Crisis risk fi-
nancing (CRF) instruments, defined as financing mech-
anisms that target a reduction of adverse socioeco-
nomic or ecological impacts of potential crises (Poole 
et al. 2020), offer this opportunity. CRF programs can 
support a proactive and timely response to drought for 
clients and beneficiaries and help governments make 
drought response plannable and more cost-efficient. 
Among the different CRF instruments, index-based risk 
transfer products, such as index insurance, have gained 
considerable traction over the last two decades for initia-
tives targeting the impacts of drought shocks on African 
smallholder farming and pastoral systems. Insurance is 
a financial protection tool that can be used to address 
relatively low frequency but high impact shocks. Un-
like conventional insurance, which is based on a claim 
verification process of the losses, index insurance uses 
payout triggering mechanisms that rely on transparent 
and objectively measured indicators of drought (that is, 
the index). Payouts are made to all policyholders when 
predetermined index thresholds are met, which are nor-
mally derived from historic realizations of the index val-
ues. This mitigates some of the key issues that make 
conventional insurance unlikely to work in African rural 
settings, such as the lack of historic ‘loss data’ required 
for assessing risk and profiling clients; the high imple-
mentation costs in remote and sparsely populated areas 
(that is, for verification, data collection, monitoring); and 
problems related to asymmetric information (for exam-
ple, adverse selection and moral hazard).
To address the challenge of extending formal insurance 
to extensive pastoral systems, several international or-
ganizations, local institutions, and private partners have, 
1 This is calculated by assuming a premium rate of 20 percent (approximately the rate applied in 2019-2020) and cost of one mature cow (TLU) expected at US$500.  
since 2008, implemented an ambitious research-for-de-
velopment agenda that resulted in the design of a set of 
innovative drought index insurance solutions that could 
cushion pastoralists against the impacts of drought, 
named Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) program. 
IBLI solutions are based on an index of the relative sea-
sonal forage availability in a given area, which is de-
rived from indicators of vegetation conditions collected 
by satellites (Vrieling et al. 2014). After years of imple-
menting an index that estimated average livestock mor-
tality, which made payouts at the end of the dry season 
for ‘asset replacement’ (Chantarat et al. 2013), the prod-
uct was redesigned with a focus on ‘asset protection’; 
payouts are provided at the onset of the drought during 
the rainy season to facilitate pastoralists implement-
ing early coping and mitigation strategies (such as pur-
chasing fodder/water/veterinary services, destocking 
before emergencies, and migration planning) to protect 
their livestock against more severe impacts (Fava and 
Vrieling 2021). Thus, the sum insured is based on the 
estimated cost of feeding and keeping the animals alive 
during the drought. 
The early trigger/early action approach pioneered in 
the IBLI ‘asset protection’ product design is, in principle, 
particularly valuable for pastoralists (Jensen et al. 2019). 
More generally, this anticipatory approach is at the fore-
front of an emerging paradigm in disaster risk financing, 
highlighting the value of preemptive responses to an-
ticipated shocks. A recent study in Kenya, for example, 
found that for every dollar invested in early response 
and resilience measures, US$2.8 are saved in later hu-
manitarian response interventions (USAID 2018). While 
there is no question that the humanitarian responses 
will continue to play a major role in supporting ex post 
disaster relief, the complementary use of anticipatory 
financial instruments can make a relevant contribution 
to protecting the livelihoods of affected households 
during drought crises. For example, livestock deaths 
due to forage scarcity can be minimized, such that ev-
ery dollar spent on purchasing insurance can protect 
US$251 worth of livestock assets. 
IBLI provision started as a fully commercial initiative with 
private insurance companies retailing it as microinsur-
ance product in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia 
since 2010. However, the huge losses and damage that 
occurred during the 2008–2011 droughts, estimated at 
US$12 billion (70 percent from the livestock sector), act-
ed as a trigger for the government of Kenya (GoK) to 
review its strategic planning on ending drought emer-
gencies. As a result, in 2013 the GoK recognized ag-
ricultural insurance as an important tool for protecting 
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farmers and herders against production crises during 
drought. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fish-
eries (MALF) allocated funding under the Second Me-
dium-Term Plan Two, 2013–2017, for (a) the implemen-
tation of a National Livestock Insurance Scheme (NLIS) 
and (b) increasing producers’ access to credit and fi-
nancial services including agricultural insurance. These 
efforts culminated in the design and launch of a pub-
lic-private arrangement (PPA), called Kenyan Live-
stock Insurance Program (KLIP), offering subsidized 
IBLI coverage to selected beneficiaries. 
KLIP started purchasing insurance coverage on be-
half of 5,000 vulnerable households from two coun-
ties (Turkana and Wajir) in October 2015. Each house-
hold received fully subsidized coverage for five tropical 
livestock units (TLUs).2 KLIP rapidly scaled up to eight 
counties in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) and to 
about 18,000 pastoralists annually. In the first five years 
of KLIP implementation, over US$10 million was paid 
out to vulnerable pastoralists to protect their 
livestock and livelihoods from severe drought events. 
2 Five TLUs were considered the least viable herd threshold size that if lost from drought shock could lead to irreversible livelihood damage, hence the choice of the gov-
ernment to provide 100 percent subsidy for five TLUs to cushion vulnerable households. A TLU is a standardized measure for livestock, where 1 cattle = 1 TLU, 1 
goats or sheep = 0.1 TLU, 1 camel = 1.4 TLU.
Recognizing the benefits of the subsidized coverage, 
but also its limitation for long-term financial sustain-
ability of the scheme, GoK has considered a voluntary 
component with partial subsidy. The partial subsidy is 
expected to be accessible by all pastoralists, but it is 
capped at 10 TLUs and 50 percent of the commercial 
premium. The GoK's proposition to offer universal ac-
cess to partial subsidy rather than to select a subset of 
beneficiaries was informed by the high cost of targeting 
and a relatively low inclusion error of universal cover-
age because poverty rates in the region are high.
This paper aims at summarizing the main components 
of KLIP and at discussing the lessons learned during 
implementation. It targets policy makers, technical ex-
perts, practitioners, and researchers interested in de-
signing and supporting the design and implementa-
tion of similar programs. Section 2 describes the KLIP 
product design, Section 3 presents the KLIP operation-
al implementation, Section 4 reports observed impacts, 
while Section 5 summarizes and critically discusses the 
key lessons learned. 
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2 KLIP product design
Index insurance products offered under KLIP relies on a low-cost, accessible, and well-established sat-
ellite indicator of drought (that is, Normalized Differ-
ence Vegetation Index - NDVI) (Annex 1), which is a 
proxy for vegetation condition. High NDVI values in-
dicate healthier vegetation and vice versa. NDVI val-
ues from coarse spatial resolution satellites (250 m 
and coarser) are generally used because (a) time se-
ries are available to describe long-term variability in 
forage conditions, (b) their daily acquisition frequen-
cy allows for more cloud-free observations to describe 
vegetation changes throughout the season, and (c) 
documented evidence exist for a strong relationship 
between rangeland biomass and NDVI for arid and 
semi-arid rangelands (for example, Dingaan and Tsubo 
2019; Schucknecht et al. 2017).
NDVI time series are elaborated to obtain an area-ag-
gregated index of relative seasonal forage availabili-
ty (Figure 1 and Annex 2). The unit areas of insurance 
(UAIs) are determined by combining local knowledge 
from pastoral communities about their grazing and mi-
gratory patterns, agro-ecological maps, and adminis-
trative borders (Chelanga et al. 2017). When the index 
falls below a predefined threshold, a payout is triggered 
and increases proportionally to the severity of estimat-
ed forage scarcity. This payout approach is based on 
the assumption that forage scarcity is an indicator of 
the early stages of drought progression toward more 
severe impacts (that is, livestock losses and food inse-
curity). Pastoralists could then use insurance payouts to 
make production decisions that mitigate the upcoming 
impacts, for example, by protecting their herds to pre-
vent high mortality or emergency sales. 
KLIP is currently operating in arid and semi-arid coun-
ties of Kenya characterized by bimodal rainfall distribu-
tion and provides an annual insurance cover for the two 
risk periods, the short rains short dry (SRSD) season, 
from October to February, and the long rains long dry 
(LRLD) season, from March to September. During the 
two risk periods, potential payouts can be triggered at 
the end of the wet months based on temporally aver-
aged NDVI values (Figure 2).
The State Department of Livestock (SDL) under the MALF 
provided guidance on the critical parameters for the KLIP 
insurance policy, such as the sum insured per TLU, the at-
tachment index thresholds, and the exit index thresholds. 
These parameters provide the basis for product pricing 
and are a result of negotiation between the underwriter 
and the GoK, which needs to consider the trade-off be-
tween frequency of payouts, magnitude of payouts, and 
premium rates. The SDL chose an attachment threshold 
correspondent to one expected payout out of five sea-
sons, a fixed exit threshold (that is, currently, -1.61), and a 
minimum payout every 5 percent (Annex 2). In terms of 
sum insured, the SDL calculated the cost of feeding 1 TLU 
to maintain it alive during a major drought, correspondent 
to US$140 per year. The annual KLIP policy allocates 42 
percent and 58 percent of the sum insured to the two po-
tential payouts (Figure 2), respectively. The premium rate 
is determined by the underwriting company(s) in consul-
tation with their reinsurers. 
The current KLIP product design resulted from a contin-
uous process of refinements since the launch of the IBLI 
program in response to the feedback from stakeholders 
and to the evolution of satellite technologies (Chantarat 
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et al. 2013; Vrieling et al. 2014; Vrieling et al. 2016; Fava 
and Vrieling 2021), taking into close consideration the 
importance of keeping the product simple, accessible, 
and transparent. KLIP is now planning to expand the 
coverage from the current eight arid counties to addi-
tional six semi-arid counties. A feasibility study (Kahiu 
and Fava 2018) emphasized that for some counties this 
would require a refinement of the product design be-
cause of differences in seasonality and heterogeneity 
in land uses (including cropping). In this perspective, 
alternative approaches have also been proposed (De 
Oto et al. 2019). Similarly, under circumstances of climat-
ic changes, the product requires periodic revisions to 
account for possible increasing frequency of extremes 
or climatic trends (for example, shift in seasonality, and 
rainfall increase/decrease). 
In terms of basis risk, there is a large body of scientif-
ic literature supporting a high correlation between NDVI 
anomalies and biomass in African drylands (for example, 
Diouf et al. 2015; Garba et al. 2017; Mahyou et al. 2018; 
Schucknecht et al. 2017; Tian et al. 2016). However, the 
lack of time series of ground observations of rangeland 
biomass in Kenya has prevented undertaking of a rigor-
ous assessment of the KLIP index accuracy in detect-
ing drought-related forage scarcity. However, the index 
has been shown to be relatively well correlated with live-
stock mortality observations (Jensen et al. 2019). 
Figure 1: KLIP index calculation steps
NDVI imagery (10-day) Spatially aggregated NDVI



























Source: Vrieling et al. 2016, with Authors’ modifications.
Figure 2: KLIP contract cover period, index calculation period, and time of payouts
1 year contract coverage
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SRSD Payout announcement LRLD Payout announcement
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Source: Authors’ elaboration
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3 KLIP implementation
KLIP is implemented under a PPA where the public sector supports an enabling environment (that is, 
regulations and infrastructure), provides subsidies, and 
creates necessary awareness about the product, while 
the private sector prices the product, provides under-
writing services, and manages payouts when triggered. 
The successful launch of KLIP involved close collabora-
tion between private and public sector actors with clear 
roles and responsibilities for key stakeholders. To facil-
itate implementation, the SDL set up a Program Man-
agement Unit (PMU) that coordinated the design and 
implementation of KLIP. The private sector formed a 
technical committee that drew membership from inter-
ested private insurers, with reinsurers actively involved 
for structured interaction with the SDL. Private sector 
engagement from the design stage and during imple-
mentation ensured that the roles between the private 
and public sectors were well articulated, facilitating the 
launch of the scheme. 
Figure 3 provides a graphic picture of institutional in-
teraction that has taken place during KLIP implementa-
tion, while in Annex 3 a detailed description of the roles 
of the public and private sector actors is provided. The 
GoK, working closely with other institutions and organi-
zations involved in natural crises response, developed 
beneficiary criteria to identify those who should bene-
fit from subsidized insurance cover. The SDL, in close 
collaboration with county governments, administrative 
officials, and local communities, then used that criteria 
to select the vulnerable households that could benefit 
from free cover. The number of beneficiaries for each 
UAI is pre-determined and forms important input to cal-
culating total paid premium. The roster of beneficiaries 
is shared with the insurance company providing under-
writing services to KLIP. The roster includes relevant cli-
ent data such as the name of the beneficiary, identity 
number, mobile phone and/or bank account numbers, 
and next of kin. The GoK also coordinates awareness 
creation campaigns and broad communication efforts 
for pastoral communities (Figure 3 upper half). 
A calculating agent determines index performance and 
percentage payouts for each risk period, following the 
approach described in Section 2 (Annexes 1 and 2) and 
the parameters indicated by the policy. The calculating 
agent is required to provide accurate, timely, transpar-
ent, and independent information to all the interested 
stakeholders. The calculating agent also manages and 
maintains the data set used for loss adjustment, doc-
uments the data processing chain for full replicability, 
provides in-season updates and maintains a backup 
dataset (Figure 3 lower half).
The index values and payout amounts are shared with 
stakeholders and officially announced at the predefined 
dates (Figure 2). The contracted insurance company(s) 
makes payouts directly to the beneficiaries as per the 
list provided by SDL, using either mobile money or 
bank transfers. Bank checks have been used to pay 
those who lack mobile or bank accounts with the 
bankers’ checks distributed using county and 
provincial administration infrastructures. 
At the initial stages of KLIP, both the registration 
and payout processes were mostly done manually, 
causing significant delays and mistakes in the pay-
ments. The utilization of existing financial service 
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infrastructure (that is, M-Pesa, agent banking) for pay-
ments of premiums and payouts, mobile-based ap-
plications for sales and clients’ registration, and a 
blended face-to-face and mobile-learning approach 
for insurance agents have helped increase efficien-
cy across the program. In addition, monthly updates 
about the progress of the season are currently pro-
vided to inform the government and the underwriter 
about the probability of payouts, so that they can start 
planning accordingly.
Knowledge institutions have played an important role 
in (a) providing technical and policy guidance to the 
GoK, (b) supporting the private sector and its agency 
networks to implement effective sales and distribution 
channels for voluntary market, and (c) conducting ac-
tionable research and impact studies to inform product/
process improvement. Support has also been offered 
by developing and delivering training to extension of-
ficers and agents who have in turn created awareness 
among the pastoral communities.






























If forage availability falls 
below a preset threshold, 
then a payout is triggered
Calculating Agent: 
determines the Index 
values and final payouts
Source: courtesy of D.C. Khalai, with Authors’ modifications.
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4 KLIP performance and impacts
KLIP impacts can be summarized at the macro level, including markets and private sector support and 
financial protection of the government budgets, and mi-
cro level, related to the livelihood and welfare of vul-
nerable pastoralists. Figure 4 provides an overview of 
KLIPs impacts, which are discussed more in detail in 
the next subsections. Overall, evidence suggests signif-
icant benefits from KLIP both in terms of establishing a 
positive feedback loop of mutual benefits (that is, a win-
win) between the public and private sector, a key ele-
ment for long-term sustainability, and in terms of deliv-
ering positive outcomes for the welfare and livelihoods 
of pastoralists during crisis and noncrisis periods. How-
ever, there is still a great need for better understanding 
of the short- and long-term impacts of KLIP on individ-
ual, community, and environmental outcomes. Moving 
forward, investments in a broader and more robust 
monitoring and evaluation infrastructure and a rigorous 
impact assessment study should remain a key priority 
to fully understand the value of initiative for resilience 
building of pastoral communities.
Macro-level impacts 
 on markets and private 
and public sectors
IBLI products were adopted by private insurance com-
panies in Kenya and Ethiopia and have been sold as a 
microinsurance retail product to pastoralists in the dry-
lands of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia since 2010 
(Figure 4). The initial launch and associated commercial-
ization and outreach were met with slow but steady de-
mand for the product. In response to these challenges, 
the product has evolved and adapted over time, thus sup-
porting a sustained demand for the product which is still 
commercially sold in Kenya and Ethiopia and increasingly 
adopted (that is, about 7,000 policies sold commercially 
in 2018) (Figures 5 and 6). The retail pilot has been in-
strumental in incubating the innovation in the Kenyan and 
Ethiopian context and in supporting the improvement of 
the product over time. However, the level of uptake and 
profitability for the private sector remained a major chal-
lenge (Jensen et al. 2018, Zewdie et al. 2020).
At its launch in 2015, KLIP initially provided fully subsi-
dized coverage to 5,000 pastoral households from Tur-
kana and Wajir counties. The program rapidly expand-
ed and, since 2017, 18,000 pastoral households have 
been covered, representing over 80,000 beneficiaries, 
across eight counties of northern Kenya (Turkana, Wajir, 
Marsabit, Mandera, Garissa, Tana River, Samburu, and 
Isiolo) (Figure 6). 
Since the program's inception, the local insurance sec-
tor in Kenya has largely benefited from the rapid ex-
pansion of KLIP not only because of the substantial 
increase of the premium volume but also in terms of 
the support received for increasing technical and op-
erational capacity to implement agricultural insurance 
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solutions. In addition, the deeper penetration of agent 
networks in pastoral areas and the need of establishing 
partnerships with telecom companies for digital finan-
cial services delivery have also stimulated new busi-
ness opportunities.
All 18,000 beneficiaries have received at least one pay-
out since KLIP was launched. The distribution of KLIP 
beneficiaries and payouts is shown in Figure 7. Some 
beneficiaries have received cumulative payouts amount-
ing to over US$1,500, for example, in Tana River (Figure 7, 
right), a relatively high amount for Kenyan pastoral econo-
my. The seasonal per capita payout maps for all KLIP UAIs 
since the launch of the program are provided in Annex 4. 
In terms of premiums, government expenditure reached 
US$2.4 million per year in 2017−2018 (Table 1) and it is 
still approximately the same as of 2020. The GoK has 
also invested growing resources for capacity building, 
awareness creation, and monitoring activities (up to 15 
percent of the total budget) and has committed to fur-
ther increase the budget allocation for the next three 
years to support geographic expansion to 14 counties 
and to increase the number of beneficiaries to 100,000 
households. 
As of end of LRLD 2020 season, the GoK has paid about 
US$9.5 million in premiums and a total of about US$10 
million in payouts have been made to KLIP beneficia-
ries. Payouts were triggered in at least one index unit 
during six of ten seasons (Table 1 and Annex 4). The se-
vere drought occurring in 2016–2017 (Uhe et al. 2018) 
led to three consecutive widespread seasonal payouts 
for a total of over US$7 million. In 2016–2017, this led 
to a major loss for insurance companies, followed by 
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Figure 5: IBLI commercial sales from 2010 to 
2019 including Kenya and Ethiopia
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 Source: Authors’ calculation
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another significant payout in 2019 (Table  1). However, 
while the substantial payouts made have raised con-
cerns about the financial sustainability of the program, 
particularly from the private sector, these outcomes 
have been well received by the GoK and insured ben-
eficiaries. The payout has proven the reliability of the 
product, demonstrating the ability to make payouts to 
pastoralists during severe and protracted drought cri-
ses. Similarly, it has increased the confidence of the 
GoK to continue supporting and expand the program, 
showing that it is possible to use private sector capi-
tal to manage risk and reduce pressure to use public 
funds, thus giving the government fiscal space to con-
tinue to implement high-yielding development projects 
Figure 6: Schematic of IBLI evolution in Kenya from the launch of the first policy in 2010
2010
106 1057 4695 5318
5000 14000 18000
7000




















































Note: The map illustrates expansion of coverage with IBLI (green), IBLI and KLIP combined (yellow), and planned KLIP expansion (light blue) in Kenya. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 7: (a) Map of KLIP beneficiaries per UAI and (b) map of the total per capita payouts for all 
KLIP UAIs from the launch of the program in 2015 to the LRLD season 2020 
Note: KLIP started in different counties/UAIs in different years (see Figure 5). This is also reflected in the total payouts received by beneficiaries. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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which can be otherwise compromised in the event of 
severe drought shocks. To address the private sector’s 
concerns, the exit threshold was modified through a 
joint agreement by KLIP stakeholders, as part of a more 
comprehensive actuarial review of the KLIP product 
that is currently ongoing. 
Impacts  on vulnerable 
pastoralists 
While impacts for vulnerable pastoralists are well docu-
mented under the IBLI program and can be broadly ex-
pected to be valid also for KLIP, no dedicated effort for 
continuous monitoring and impact assessment at the 
household level has been put in place for KLIP. As such, 
only few circumstantial studies are available specifically 
for KLIP, leaving an important gap in our understanding 
of the program’s impacts. Notwithstanding this premise, 
some important considerations can be made that could 
also inform a future, more comprehensive agenda. 
Robust multi-year impact evaluation surveys on the IBLI 
program in Kenya and Ethiopia have evidenced consid-
erable social and welfare benefits for pastoralists who 
have insured their livestock (Figure 4: box 3 - protect 
vulnerable). During good years, insured households 
respond to their insurance coverage by increasing in-
vestments in livestock veterinary and vaccination ser-
vices, selling more livestock, and reducing their herd 
size (Jensen et al. 2017; Matsuda et al. 2019). These 
changes to production strategies result in positive im-
pacts on indicators of well-being in good and drought 
seasons, including increased household income per 
adult equivalent and reduced reliance on costly ex ante 
risk reducing strategies, such as distress selling of live-
stock or skipping meals (Janzen and Carter 2019; Jen-
sen et al. 2017; Matsuda et al. 2019). It should be noted 
that the reported evidence is related to the impacts of 
insurance on households that choose to purchase in-
surance, whereas KLIP targets a particular group and 
transfers insurance to them. However, they should be 
broadly generalizable as long as the KLIP clients were 
equally informed on the details of their coverage.
A study using data from a survey of over 1,000 KLIP 
beneficiaries in Marsabit and Isiolo after the 2016–2017 
drought examined how KLIP beneficiaries changed 
their coping strategies in anticipation of the coming of 
payments and then how they spent those funds once 
they were received. Nearly all respondents reported us-
ing some of the payouts for human food, but most also 
used payouts to buy forage/fodder, water, and veteri-
nary services for their livestock (Taye et al. 2019). Such 
a pattern of expenditures provides strong evidence that 
many households do have access to these livestock in-
put markets, which are critical to protecting livestock 
during drought, and can use KLIP payouts to this end.
Similar results were found by an independent impact 
study led by German Agency for International Cooper-
ation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit, GIZ) (CED 2018). Self-reported satisfaction 
with the program was high and many beneficiaries re-
ported using the payouts at least partly for expenses on 
their livestock (maintenance, restocking, and produc-
tion equipment) and for household needs. In addition, 
there is qualitative evidence of positive spillovers, such 
as sharing payouts with neighbors. Despite the short 
lifetime of the program, KLIP households experience 
slightly lower levels of food insecurity and higher level 
of general insurance awareness.
Table 1: Summary of KLIP premiums, seasonal payouts, loss ratios, insured households, and TLUs




No. of TLUs Total sum 
Insured 
Premiuma Payoutsa Loss ratio (%)
2015–16 Short rains 2 5,000 25,000 5.59 0.56 6.24
Long rains 2 5,000 25,000 0.035
2016–17 Short rains 6 14,010 70,050 8.92 1.64 2.150 320.95
Long rains 6 13,776 68,880 3.130
2017–18 Short rains 8 18,012 90,060 12.61 2.46 1.750 71.02
Long rains 8 18,012 90,060
2018–19 Short rains 8 18’,012 90,060 12.61 2.41 0.880 160.75
Long rains 8 18,012 90,060 2.990
2019–20 Short rains 8 18,012 90,060 12.61 2.41 0.000 0.00
Long rains 8 18,012 90,060 0.000
Total 52.34 9.5 10.940 115.25
Note: a. US$, million. 
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5 Lessons learned and way forward
The first five years of implementation of KLIP have generated a huge amount of information on how to 
scale up a drought risk financing solution from the pilot 
stage to a national program. This is gaining considerable 
attention from other African countries, who are express-
ing interest toward implementing similar solutions. The 
following sections summarize key lessons learned.
Design  of a PPA model 
The PPA model developed under KLIP, while still needing 
refinements, is one of the key innovations of the program. 
A PPA approach was preferred for KLIP because private 
sector-only implementation proved difficult to scale and 
keep the private sector interested in offering IBLI retail 
coverage, due to the costs of distribution and relatively 
low uptake. The PPA helped in developing a new model 
for sustainable livestock insurance provision and social 
protection. Two main considerations informed GoK deci-
sion to provide full subsidy to some households: (a) pro-
vide substantial subsidy to crowd-in private sector and 
put in place mechanisms to expand the voluntary com-
ponent and (b) reduce SDL response cost when drought 
strikes. The full subsidy offered by GoK to vulnerable 
households could be considered as social protection, 
while voluntary purchases as commercial insurance. 
Government leadership. KLIP originates from a clear 
commitment of the GoK to support and scale an 
innovative index insurance solution to build pastoralists’ 
resilience to drought. The active participation and finan-
cial involvement of the public sector has been funda-
mental to the rapid expansion of the geographic scope 
and the number of insured households and is critical for 
continuation of the program, which aligns with agricul-
tural insurance initiatives worldwide. The GoK is provid-
ing and supporting direct critical investments in aware-
ness creation and financial infrastructure development 
(for example, registration systems) and is developing an 
enabling regulatory and policy environment. The nega-
tive side of a strong government leadership is the po-
tential program vulnerability to changing political con-
text, which also reduces the private sector confidence 
to make long-term investments. A strong involvement 
of the private sector into the planning and development 
of the program, together with a medium-term budget al-
location framework from the government, can mitigate 
this challenge. 
Private sector centrality and clearly defined role. The 
private sector has been the engine of KLIP, relying on 
the experience and capacity built over years of imple-
mentation of IBLI. KLIP relies on the private sector for 
the administration of the insurance policies and the as-
sociated financial transactions, the risk transfer to the 
reinsurance industry, and the actuarial analysis of the in-
surance product, among others. The private sector also 
plays a critical role for the long-term sustainability of 
the program by supporting awareness creation efforts 
and by stimulating the expansion of the retail insurance 
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market and associated financial and extension services. 
Operational challenges encountered during KLIP, dis-
cussed more in detail below, suggest, however, that 
the private sector’s role needs to be carefully defined 
and that procurement and underwriting services com-
missioned by governments should include mechanisms 
(for example, performance assessments) to incentiv-
ize investments on the retail market and financial infra-
structures to ensure that firms do not merely compete 
for the government’s tender without investing in exten-
sion and on voluntary sales.
Subsidized coverage. KLIP has provided fully subsi-
dized coverage to all selected beneficiaries. This has 
been instrumental in developing the PPA and in rapidly 
expanding the program. However, fully subsidized in-
surance does have some important drawbacks if used 
‘per se’ rather than as part of a comprehensive strategy 
toward incentivizing more awareness about the product 
and the expansion of the insurance market in the target 
regions. In addition, the provision of full subsidies to 
the same target beneficiaries in KLIP has in some cases 
created double dipping and confusion issues with safe-
ty net or cash transfer programs. Possible solutions to 
overcome this challenge include, for example, asking 
target beneficiaries to pay at least a minimal contribu-
tion (that is, a token) for the coverage and introducing 
a graduation process from the subsidy. A balanced use 
of smart subsidy schemes targeting different types of 
beneficiaries and bonded to good practices from both 
the insurer and the clients could be an important step 
for the next stages of the program.
Product  design 
Accurate product design has been a pillar for KLIP and 
continues to be a necessary component of the program 
in its upscaling trajectory. The capacity of the program 
to promptly adapt the product in response to stake-
holders’ feedback and to the evolving climatic/geo-
graphic context has been of paramount importance to 
creating confidence about the reliability of KLIP. In addi-
tion, while there is sound evidence that the KLIP index 
is overall robust (that is, the basis risk is low), the geo-
graphic scaling of the program to other Kenyan regions 
(especially to semi-arid or sub-humid drylands dominat-
ed by agropastoral livelihoods) or new countries will re-
quire careful product design work. This highlights the 
need for product design to become part of the planned 
government investments to support the program and/
or the private sector. 
Early drought detection for early action. A milestone 
for the program has been the shift from a livestock 
mortality–asset replacement index design to a forage 
scarcity–asset protection paradigm, thus from a logic 
of loss indemnification to a logic of early detection for 
early response. This proved to be more accurate and, 
even more importantly, more cost-effective in mitigating 
the impacts on drought, thus financially sustainable (by 
reducing the cost of the premiums). Similar programs 
should consider this innovative logic from the design 
phase and explore the use of the best technologies to 
achieve the goal of early assessment toward mitigation 
of catastrophic impacts. 
Basis risk and quality assessment. The IBLI product im-
plemented in KLIP has been proved to be simple, trans-
parent, and, at least up to now, accurate in detecting 
major drought events. However, the lack of long-term 
spatially explicit ground data sets of rangeland biomass 
in Kenya did not allow a direct assessment of the index 
accuracy with respect to the selected indicator of the 
risk covered (that is, forage scarcity). Similarly, there are 
no reliable long-term and high frequency datasets link-
ing drought impacts on forage availability to livestock 
conditions and household welfare/food security. These 
gaps prevent a more comprehensive evaluation of the 
basis risk and a comparative analysis of alternative in-
dices and product designs. The need of robust, trans-
parent, and actionable strategies and methodologies 
for quality assessment of index insurance products, 
backed by dedicated ground data collection efforts, is 
thus a priority for geographic scaling and product de-
sign improvement with emerging technologies.
Operational  implementation
Effective implementation is as important as technical 
design, as experience with inaccurate registration of 
beneficiaries and delayed payments in KLIP has shown 
that the benefits coming from a sound product design 
can be largely undermined by operational challenges. 
Accurate identification and registration of the beneficia-
ries and efficient payout delivery mechanisms are es-
sential. However, difficulties persist due to the lack of a 
clear mechanism and workflow for preparatory steps to 
be undertaken in the event of a drought. Ensuring that 
the design of infrastructure for premium collection and 
payout distribution is robust before the launch of simi-
lar schemes is crucial to ensure development impact is 
achieved, trust is built in that scheme, and the scheme 
is sustainable.
Payout management. Drought shocks can be persistent 
and might pose considerable claim servicing challenges 
to the underwriting company(s). KLIP has paid out more 
than what has been collected as premium in some years, 
resulting in large loss ratio as it was seen in the 2016–
2017 season. KLIP has paid out in six of ten seasons. 
This has raised a cash call challenge, putting serious 
strain on timely handling of payouts. While the product 
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is designed to immediately pay after the end of the rainy 
season, there have been delays in the range of more 
than three months after the result declaration. Such de-
lays in payouts are detrimental to sustainability of the 
scheme because they erode government and benefi-
ciary’s confidence in the scheme. More efforts or weight 
should be attached to the ability to service large claims 
during the underwriter selection process. It is common 
for the underwriting company to focus on substantial 
premium collected through financing such scheme; 
however, if the underwriting capabilities are weak, it will 
struggle to service claims. 
Subsidy administration. Several options for subsidy ad-
ministration exist and the best one should be selected 
based on the country’s procurement laws and regula-
tions governing procurement of goods and services by 
the public sector. In situations where some households 
are benefiting from full subsidies, the government may 
adopt the normal goods and services procurement ap-
proach that in most cases involves expression of inter-
est, selecting the most qualified firm and getting a com-
prehensive quote where the most competitive provider 
is selected. Experience in KLIP has shown that such an 
approach has undesired consequences, which include 
minimal investment to build necessary infrastructure for 
promoting voluntary uptake. The uncertainty that re-
sults from a winner-take-it-all procurement approach 
has negative impact on growth and development of 
the insurance market, so alternative options should be 
considered. In addition, the following considerations 
should be made when launching the subsidized insur-
ance scheme with government support: (a) the full sub-
sidy should be launched at the same time with a vol-
untary component (whether it is partially subsidized or 
not) and (b) an incentive-based structure to subsidies 
should be put in place, for example, by allocating the 
full subsidies proportionally to the number of voluntary 
policies sold, thus incentivizing the private sector to in-
vest in developing infrastructure for voluntary purchase 
promotion. Such an approach could ensure that private 
sector players actively participate in the expansion of 
the program as per business growth strategy.
Harmonized drought risk management. KLIP is part of 
a complex multilayered drought risk management strat-
egy framework in Kenya, including early warning sys-
tems, safety net programs, sovereign risk transfer, and 
insurance. Although they are complementary in prin-
ciple, these tools often have overlapping areas which 
can create confusion among stakeholders, cause se-
rious inefficiencies, and, without proper coordination, 
can result in missed opportunities for synergies. The fu-
ture upscaling of KLIP would require a stronger effort of 
coordination and harmonization of KLIP with the other 
drought risk financing instruments, with the goal of pro-
moting synergies between their finance mechanisms, 
targeting approaches, and management infrastructures. 
Making  and monitoring 
impacts
KLIP largely benefited from the long-term market and 
capacity development efforts made in pastoral areas 
as well as from the robust household-level impact as-
sessment conducted during the implementation of the 
retail IBLI initiative. However, considering its size, the 
program has shown limited capacity in carrying on with 
similar activities, especially at the level of pastoral com-
munities. This is a serious drawback that needs to be 
addressed in the continuation of the program.
Awareness creation and capacity development. 
Awareness creation of clients and beneficiaries and ca-
pacity development at all levels in the public and pri-
vate sectors (that is, policy makers, institutional and 
executive stakeholders, extension agents, insurance 
agents, program partners) have been important in the 
KLIP agenda from its inception. Awareness creation ef-
forts have been led by the government with support 
from knowledge institutions and variable level of invest-
ment. However, targeting pastoral communities proved 
to be difficult for the government due to the cost and 
extension infrastructure deficiencies. When design-
ing similar schemes in the future, it is critical to intro-
duce smart subsidized coverage early in the rollout of 
the product, coupled with adequate budget provision 
to cover the costs of awareness creation and capaci-
ty development, using innovative techniques (such as 
e-learning and m-learning), workshops, and education-
al initiatives. This need for strengthening capacity at all 
levels is foundational and requires sufficient resources 
for such schemes to achieve sustainability. 
Program monitoring and impact assessment. The few 
impact studies being conducted specifically on KLIP 
were of limited scope, and no monitoring and rigorous 
impact assessment strategy has been effectively imple-
mented to assess or track the program’s impacts over 
time. Several attempts have been made during KLIP to 
implement a simple monitoring and evaluation frame-
work, but the lack of clarity on objectives and funding 
streams has hampered the process. As a result, there 
is still a strong need to increase understanding on the 
evolution of KLIP and its impact on a growing number of 
beneficiaries (including the environmental component). 
Such assessments are essential to ensuring that the 
insurance is operating as intended and improving the 
program. It is therefore critical to include monitoring, im-
pact assessment, and cost-benefit analysis frameworks 
since the inception of such types of programs to ensure 
lessons and evidence are gathered. 
Linking financial resilience to physical resilience. While 
KLIP is designed to contribute to building financial resil-
ience of pastoral households, its long-term development 
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effectiveness also critically depends on complementary 
interventions supporting physical resilience (that is, tar-
geting key livestock value chains), offering pastoralists 
multiple options for protecting their livestock and stimu-
lating stronger markets. KLIP payouts have been used to 
buy forage/fodder, water, and veterinary services, provid-
ing evidence that many pastoral households do have ac-
cess to these livestock input markets, but questions re-
main on the extent to which the limitations in the livestock 
inputs might be a serious constraint for the use of pay-
outs in some areas or during catastrophic drought. While 
it is difficult to assess if the financial resilience intervention 
supported by KLIP could have provided a stimulus for the 
development of livestock input markets, it is essential that, 
in the continuation of the program, links with other live-
stock value chain interventions would be established, 
with targeted investments to create positive feedbacks 
loops toward comprehensive resilience building. 
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6 Conclusions
KLIP has provided evidence that it is possible to de-velop a PPA to scale up an index-based insurance 
scheme to provide critical insurance protection to vul-
nerable pastoralists in Sub-Saharan African drylands, 
previously a feat which was thought to be impossible. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates how a government, by 
creating an enabling environment and targeted subsi-
dies, can crowd-in private sector capacity and expertise 
to support its achievement of policy priorities. Needless 
to say, with over five years of supporting the GoK de-
sign and then implementing KLIP, a significant amount 
of knowledge and practical experience about the op-
portunities and challenges of designing and operation-
alizing a PPA has been gathered. Key lessons learned, 
that should be generalizable to similar programs, in-
clude the following:
• Government leadership and direct investment in
index insurance initiatives are possible and can be
effective if associated with a strong partnership
with the private sector with clearly defined roles
and incentive structures. A mechanism for long-
term public commitment needs to be established
to guarantee the stability of the scheme.
• Subsidies for scaling and consolidating the
scheme are important and instrumental, but they
also need to be associated with smart targeting
mechanisms and with incentives to the private
sector to develop and expand the market.
• Creating awareness and strengthening capacity at
all levels is foundational and requires enough re-
sources for such schemes to achieve sustainability. 
• Impact assessment requires investment, planning,
and preparation. It is therefore recommended that
a rigorous impact study and cost-benefit analysis
of the program be included in the design phase, to 
ensure lessons and evidence is gathered.
• The shift from a drought assessment and impact
response paradigm (livestock mortality–asset
replacement) to a drought early detection and im-
pact mitigation paradigm (forage scarcity–asset 
protection) has been a fundamental step to improve 
the value and cost-effectiveness of the scheme. 
• Accurate product design is critical to create trust
and deliver impacts, but the data infrastructure for
assessing product quality and inter-comparison is
weak if not absent. The need of robust, transpar-
ent, and actionable strategies and methodologies
for quality assessment of index insurance prod-
ucts is thus a priority.
• Engaging with local and international stakeholders 
and tailoring the product to the specific agroeco-
logical and socioeconomic context and evolving
environmental conditions is a fundamental neces-
sity not just during the program design phases, but 
along the whole program implementation cycle.
• Effective implementation is as (if not more) import-
ant as technical design. Ensuring that the design
of the premium collection and payment infrastruc-
ture is robust before the launch of similar schemes, 
also leveraging on existing financial service infra-
structures, is crucial to ensure development im-
pact is achieved, trust is built in the scheme, and
the scheme is sustainable.
• The future upscaling of KLIP and similar initiatives
would require a strong effort of coordination and
harmonization of the different drought risk man-
agement initiatives to optimize their finance mech-
anisms, targeting approaches, and data and man-
agement infrastructures.
Moving forward, given the vastity of drylands in Africa 
and the millions of households considerably affected 
by drought shocks, there is significant scope to scale 
up KLIP-like approaches in other countries. The authors 
trust that the lessons documented in this note can sup-
port the effective design and implementation of future 
programs. 
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This annex describes the tasks required to process the remotely sensed NDVI time series data to obtain the Input 
for the index calculation. 
KLIP uses satellite imagery for calculating a seasonal forage scarcity index for each UAI. By the end of a given season 
(that is end of June for long rains, end of December for short rains), the forage scarcity index for each UAI is com-
pared to that unit’s historical index readings to determine if a payout should be made. 
Three main remote sensing data processing steps are required:
• Downloading the dekadal NDVI images from the internet during the seasonal coverage period for all the KLIP
covered area;
• Detecting and removing pixels with limited temporal variability;
• Calculating a dekadal spatial average of the NDVI for each UAI.
The steps are detailed in the following sections. 
Downloading  the NDVI data
• For KLIP, the eMODIS NDVI C6 product is the data source. This NDVI data set is obtained from the Moderate
Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) flown onboard NASA’s AQUA satellite. The Earth Resources
Observation Systems (EROS) Data Center (EDC) of the US Geological Survey (USGS) transforms the daily imag-
es into 10-day composites (10 days is often referred to as ‘dekad’), which are referred to as eMODIS.
• To reduce the remaining atmospheric effects, such as clouds, a temporal filtering is applied on the data, which
requires three dekads before and three dekads after the value (image) to be filtered. For this reason, final
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filtered eMODIS images are only available about one month later. Filtered eMODIS data are currently provided 
for Africa in the framework of FEWS-NET activities. The eMODIS data for the target areas are available from 
January 2003 up to date.
• The long archive of data containing months with only filtered data is obtained for the East Africa region from https://
earlywarning.usgs.gov/fews/datadownloads/East%20Africa/eMODIS%20NDVI%20C6 (last access 02/09/2020).
• The most recent 10-day composite usually is provided about three days after the end date of the compositing
window. For example, the January 1−10 image is provided by January 13. Given the mentioned issues with filter-
ing, the final filtered version of that same image will be available one month later, that is, by February 13.
Spatial averaging  and masking
• For each filtered 10-day NDVI image (for the nonoverlapping dekads), a spatial averaging of the NDVI values
within a UAI needs to be performed (the updated shapefile should be requested to the SDL). The eMODIS pix-
els are assigned to a specific UAI if their pixel center falls within that unit. In principle, all pixels for which this is
true are used for calculating the spatial average. The only exceptions are those pixels that have a very limited
temporal variability (that is if the difference between 5th and 95th percentiles of NDVI values in the historical time 
series is below 0.05).





This annex describes the tasks required to convert the processed remotely sensed NDVI time series into a forage 
scarcity index and to calculate seasonal payouts according to the KLIP methodology. 
The following calculation steps are necessary to convert dekadal NDVI values for each UAI into the insurance index: 
• Monthly NDVI calculation. Dekadal NDVI time series in each UAI are converted into monthly NDVI time series 
by averaging the three dekadal NDVI values in each month.
• Temporal aggregation. The monthly NDVI data are averaged over time into a seasonal index (seasonal NDVI).
Two consecutive rainfall seasons are observed in Northern Kenya, followed by respective dry seasons. They are 
referred to as ‘long rains’ (March–June) and ‘short rains’ (October–December). NDVI values for each UAI are 
averaged for the long rains and short rains months.
• Standardizing aggregated NDVI data (standard score). The standard score (Z-score) of each season’s (that is,
long rains and short rains) seasonal NDVI value is calculated with reference to the historical average and stan-
dard deviation (the benchmark period is from 2003 to the last available observation at the time the KLIP annual 
policy is issued).
Index calculation
The following steps show the mathematical formulae for the index calculation process. The NDVI data used for 
constructing the index and parameterizing the range of insurance contracts are depicted as NDVI ( NDVI i,d,m,y 
NDVI i,d,m,y ) for each UAI i in dekad d, month m, and year y and are obtained by preprocessing pixel-level dekadal 
NDVI data of all pixels in each UAI. The following steps are required to calculate the index from NDVI ( NDVI i,d,m,y 
NDVI i,d,m,y ):
1. Monthly NDVI ( NDVI 
i,m,y
 ) for each UAI i in month m and year y is obtained by averaging the three dekadal val-
ues in each month:
2. Seasonal NDVI ( Avg  NDVI 
i,m,y
 ) for each UAI i in month m and year y is obtained by averaging monthly NDVI from
the beginning to the end of the long rain season (March–June) and short rain season (October–December):
3. Standard score (Z-score) of the seasonal NDVI for each UAI i in each month m and each year y ( ZAvg  NDVI 
i,m,y
) is then calculated using the historical mean (E) and standard deviation (SD) of the particular UAI and month:
 ZAvgNDVI i,m,y =  
Avg  NDVI i,m,y − E ( Avg  NDVI i,m )    ______________________ 
SD ( Avg  NDVI i,m )
 
The KLIP index (I) is numerically equal to the  ZAvgNDVI 
i,m,y
 :
 I i,m,y = ZAvgNDVI i,m,y 
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A payout of the insurance contract for each UAI i is triggered when the index I in the last month M of the covered 
period (that is, June for long rains and December for short rains) in year y falls below a predetermined value of   I 
i,M,y for that month, called the attachment threshold. In case the index is lower than another predetermined value 
called exit threshold, the total sum insured allocated to that season is paid out.3 Between the attachment and exit 
values, the payouts are a linear function of the index. 
A minimum payout at 5 percent of the total sum insured allocated to that season is given when the index value falls 
below the attachment, but the calculated payout is below the minimum payout threshold.
Attachment and exit determination
For each UAI and season (that is, long rains and short rains), the attachment and exit values are set according to the
following procedure: 
•
The attachment values are set to the 20th percentile of the index values' empirical distribution including all the
seasonal index data from 2003 to the date the policy is issued.
•
The exit value is fixed to −1.61.
3 The sum insured allocated to the short rains and long rains seasons are 42 percent and 58 percent of the total sum insured annually, respectively.
Payout determination
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ANNEX 3
Roles and responsibilities of 
public and private sectors 
The GoK, motivated by willingness to end drought emergencies, initiated the process of designing and implement-
ing KLIP with technical assistance from both the World Bank and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). 
Since the early stages of KLIP design the important role of both public and private sector players was recognized 
and a joint implementation approach was recommended with clarity on roles and responsibilities of public and pri-
vate actors. 
Roles undertaken by the public sector during 
design and implementation of KLIP
• Program management. KLIP was initiated by the government; therefore, the SDL in the MALF played the lead-
ership role. The SDL formed a dedicated PMU to guide implementation and to coordinate government insti-
tutions with stake in the implementation process, for example, Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA). The PMU
comprised technical officers, administration officers, and a process management adviser and continued to re-
ceive technical assistance from ILRI and the World Bank during design and implementation of KLIP. The PMU
is responsible for the day-to-day operational running of KLIP, including awareness creation and coordination
of beneficiary selection, and working closely with underwriting company(s) to ensure payouts are delivered as
per service-level agreements. IRA provided advisory on matters relating to regulation and product approval.
• Beneficiary selection. The government provides full subsidy to vulnerable households, selected using criteria
developed through consultative approach led by the SDL and involving other organizations or institutions work-
ing on drought risk management such as the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) and develop-
ment partners providing humanitarian response. The selection of KLIP beneficiaries considers the following: (a)
livestock ownership; (b) whether the household is already a beneficiary from existing social safety net schemes,
such as the NDMA-led Hunger Safety Net Program (HNSP) that operates in some counties; (c) whether house-
holds have formal financial access or demonstrate willingness to open a bank account or any other recognized
formal payment system. The PMU, working closely with representatives from county governments and commu-
nity leaders, undertook beneficiary registration, capturing all the necessary information, including names of the
beneficiary, national Identification numbers, next of kin, and other relevant information. The PMU determined
the number of households to receive subsidy from each UAI. The data on beneficiaries are shared with selected
underwriter(s) for pricing and payout administration.
• Subsidy administration. The SDL pays premium on behalf of selected households to selected underwriters,
chosen through tendering process. Premium budget is allocated within the MALF budget earmarked for live-
stock insurance purposes. The procurement of an insurance company to provide cover under KLIP is undertak-
en by the SDL with support from IRA. It involves preparing tender documents which outline the conditions for
the cover, short-listing interested companies that should meet certain selection procedures as outlined in the
tender documents. The insurance company offering the best quote and other support services is contracted to
offer the IBLI product. Interested insurance companies can quote as individuals or as a consortium. The winning
insurance company is encouraged to share the business with interested local underwriters and reinsure the
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remaining portion. The winning underwriter receives premium from the SDL for the selected beneficiaries and 
makes payout directly to the beneficiaries if there is a trigger. 
• Awareness creation. The KLIP PMU is also coordinating awareness creation and capacity-building efforts
for pastoralists and institutional stakeholders through targeted campaigns in pastoral areas and county-lev-
el awareness creation events. Up to 15 percent of the GoK’s annual budget for KLIP is allocated to this effort.
Roles undertaken  by the private sector
• Underwriting. The underwriting function is undertaken by private insurance companies which might choose to
underwrite as individual insurance or form a pool of interested companies. The SDL chose to apply existing pro-
curement laws to procure the right insurance company to underwrite IBLI under KLIP. Kenya procurement laws
require the procuring entity to develop tender documents and invite insurance companies to express interest.
The companies meeting a minimum selection criterion are invited to quote as per the terms and conditions of
tender documents. The initial call for expression of interest resulted in a consortium of six insurance companies
and one individual company being short-listed to provide quotation. The first and second KLIP cycles were in-
sured by the selected consortium annually while in the subsequent tenders the government extended procure-
ment from one year to three years after the private sector raised concerns of one-year contracts. The tender for
the third cycle was won by a single insurance company to provide insurance cover for three years. The tender
conditions encouraged business sharing and the winning entity could share the business with other interested
insurance companies locally. The insurance companies consider KLIP insurance a high risk business and take
just a small portion of risk by transferring a big part of the risk to reinsurance companies. At the design stages
of KLIP, consideration was given to set up a Technical Support Unit (TSU) to house technical expertise centrally,
given the costs of technical tasks related to livestock insurance. The TSU was expected to perform a range of
services for the private sector that included (a) demand assessment; (b) product design and rating, including
basis risk analysis; (c) design of operating systems and procedures; and (d) training of stakeholders and coordi-
nation of awareness creation. While the role to be played by the TSU was considered important for the private
sector to play its role effectively, it was never set up. The World Bank and ILRI continued to support some of
those tasks with the danger of leaving the private sector weak when the technical assistance comes to closure.
• Payouts management. Under KLIP’s fully subsidized component, the SDL provides the underwriting insurance
company with a list of beneficiaries. The underwriting company is expected to make direct payouts to the list of
beneficiaries provided in case trigger conditions are met. The contractual agreement between the SDL and un-
derwriting company stipulates the period required to deliver payout to the beneficiaries. The underwriting com-
pany is free to choose the most effective and affordable methods to deliver payouts. Bank and mobile money
accounts are the preferred methods by insurance companies; bankers’ checks are used when the beneficiaries
lack bank or mobile money account. The underwriting insurance company is expected to organize payouts us-
ing its preferred model as long as beneficiaries receive the money without delay. There is a strong partnership
between insurance companies, banks, and mobile money operators, which has been developed to deliver pay-
outs. In addition, there is consideration to use banks’ infrastructure (and other distribution channels) to promote
the voluntary component, which is a requirement by the GoK.
• Calculating agent. The calculating agent is another private sector role. The underwriting company agrees with
the SDL on a suitable calculating agent, expected to be knowledgeable on remote sensing and insurance to de-
termine how the season has performed and the payouts. The initial calculating agent work was initially procured 
to the private sector by the underwriter. However, since the question on who should pay for the services (SDL
or underwriting company) has not been adequately addressed, since 2016 ILRI has been providing the service
on an interim basis while identifying a suitable approach for service procurement and payment.




The following maps illustrate the seasonal payout per beneficiary (in KES) from the launch of the KLIP in 2015 to the 
long rains of 2020. Areas in white are not covered by KLIP.
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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Source: Authors’ elaboration
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